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Digital signatures guarantee the authenticity and transferability of messages, and are widely used
in modern communication. The security of currently used classical digital signature schemes, how-
ever, relies on computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes
offer information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. We present two
QDS protocols which have the same experimental requirements as quantum key distribution, which
is already commercially available. We also present the first security proof for any QDS scheme
against coherent forging attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are commonly used to guarantee the identity of a sender and the authenticity of a message,
for example in electronic commerce and e-mail. Importantly, digital signatures also guarantee that messages are
transferable, so that a forwarded message will also be accepted as valid. These cryptographic tasks are different
from ensuring that a message is kept secret. Rivest, one of the inventors of the RSA algorithm for public key
cryptography, wrote in 1990 that “the notion of a digital signature may prove to be one of the most fundamental and
useful inventions of modern cryptography” [1]. Currently used classical digital signature schemes employ public key
encryption, where security relies on conjectured but unproven computational hardness of cryptographic functions.
In contrast, quantum digital signature schemes [2–6], which are quantum versions of Lamport’s one-time signature
scheme [7], offer information-theoretic security relying on the laws of quantum mechanics.
We mainly consider the simplest non-trivial setting for digital signatures, with three parties, which is sufficient to
illustrate how our protocols work. Alice signs the message, Bob first receives the message and needs to authenticate
it, and Charlie receives the forwarded message from Bob, and verifies that the initial source was indeed Alice. The
desired protocol needs to be secure against cheating, provided that at most one of the three parties is dishonest. We
require security both against message forging by Bob and against repudiation by Alice 1. In our setting, successful
repudiation by Alice means that a message is accepted by Bob but would be rejected when forwarded to Charlie, that
is, the message is not transferable 2. In our QDS protocols, it is easier to forge a message when claiming it to be
forwarded, and in forging scenarios we therefore assume that Bob is trying to forge a forwarded message.
QDS schemes have two stages, the distribution stage and the messaging stage. In the latter stage, a message is
actually sent and signed. While details vary, different schemes share common features. During the distribution stage
Alice sends a quantum signature, a sequence of quantum states, to Bob and Charlie. In order to prevent repudiation,
∗ V. Dunjko and P. Wallden contributed equally to this work.
† petros.wallden@gmail.com
1 These are the most significant forms of cheating. Our protocols can be extended to the many-party setting, and to deal with general
cheating attacks in that context, but since this complicates the protocols and security analysis somewhat we postpone full discussion
for future work.
2 Repudiation by Alice means that she can successfully deny having sent a message that she actually did send. Preventing repudiation is
closely related to, but not in general equivalent to, ensuring message transferrability, i.e. ensuring that forwarded messages are accepted
as valid. For example, a poorly designed protocol can fail to ensure transferability even if Alice is honest. In our scenario with one sender
and two receivers, non-repudiation and message transferrability become identical if a majority decision is used to resolve disputes.
2they can either compare their states [2] or symmetrise them [3–6]. Bob and Charlie then either store the quantum
signature, or measure it and store the outcomes. In the messaging stage, which could occur much later, Alice wants to
sign a message. During the messaging stage, Alice sends the classical description of the quantum signature, and Bob
and Charlie confirm that this is compatible with their stored information. Importantly, the participants must be able
to decide on the validity and transferrability of the message without further communication with other participants.
The first QDS protocol, proposed by Gottesman and Chuang [2], required involved processing of the quantum
signatures – a general SWAP test and long-term quantum memory – which is currently unfeasible experimentally.
In [3], an optical multiport replaced the SWAP test. Long-term quantum memory was however still required. To
remedy this, we suggested a protocol [5] where the signature states are measured directly in the distribution stage.
This protocol guaranteed security against collective attacks, but still employed a multiport to ensure non-repudiation.
When implemented [6], however, the multiport caused substantial losses. Aligning the multiport becomes increasingly
difficult when the distance between recipients increases. Here we therefore propose two schemes for quantum digital
signatures which require neither quantum memory, nor a multiport. They require only the same components as
quantum key distribution (QKD), enabling existing QKD “hardware” to be used also for QDS. This significantly
extends and enhances the use of QKD systems.
The two protocols are denoted P1 and P2. There are many possible variations on these protocols, e.g. using
different quantum states for the quantum signatures (such as phase-encoded coherent states) or different types of
measurements (unambiguous quantum state discrimination, minimum-error measurements, etc.). Here, we will focus
on protocols employing BB84 states, as they are well-studied in the context of QKD, and this choice allows for the
first proof of security against coherent forging attacks.
P1 is inspired by the protocol in [5, 6], while P2 only uses quantum-mechanical features to produce secret shared
classical keys using QKD. After this, P2 continues with a classical scheme, with information-theoretic security relying
on the security of the shared secret keys. This means that the functionality of information-theoretically secure digital
signatures follows directly from point-to-point QKD. To our knowledge, there are few information-theoretically secure
classical digital signature schemes based on secret shared keys, and all of them require extra assumptions such as
the existence of a trusted third party [8, 9] or the existence of authenticated broadcast channels [10]. Using P2,
the functionality of digital signatures is implied by sharing secret keys alone. Since P1 uses the same “quantum
hardware” as the generation of secret keys by QKD, for use in P2, it is an open question whether P1 or P2 is most
resource-efficient, in particular when generalising to more than three parties.
Just as for QKD, for QDS schemes one assumes that between all parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, there exist pairwise
authenticated classical channels, guaranteeing that classical messages cannot be tampered with. Such channels are
resource-inexpensive [11]. Moreover, for both QKD and QDS it is essential that participants can be sufficiently
sure that if a quantum state is sent, then (approximately) that same quantum state is also received, without an
eavesdropper or forger having learnt (too much) about it. How to achieve this is well established for QKD, and
we expect that similar techniques can be used for QDS. We further comment on this in the discussion at the end.
However, for the moment, we will for P1 make the stronger assumption (which existing QDS protocols also make) that
there are authenticated ideal quantum channels between the participants. This guarantees that the quantum state
any participant sends is received by the intended recipient. Nevertheless, we formulate our protocol with non-ideal
channels in mind, and also note that analysis of previous QDS experiments [4, 6] has considered imperfections in
scenarios with only individual forging attacks.
II. PROTOCOL P1
A main difference between P1 and the protocols in [5, 6] is that a multiport is not needed. Instead, security against
repudiation is guaranteed by Bob and Charlie exchanging some of their signature elements, leading to a significantly
simpler experimental implementation. In the basic version of P1, the exchange is done before measuring the signature
states, and in a modified version P1’, described in Appendix A, after measuring them. We will use the same four
quantum states as the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution [12], given by
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (1)
As discussed above, we assume that between all parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, there exist authenticated classical
and quantum channels.
Distribution stage
1. For each possible future one-bit message k = 0, 1, Alice generates two copies of sequences of BB84 states,
QuantSigk =
⊗L
l=1 ρ
k
l where ρ
k
l is a randomly chosen BB84 state,
∣∣ψkl 〉 = ∣∣bkl 〉, and bkl ∈ {−, 0,+, 1}, and L is
3a suitably chosen integer. The state QuantSigk and the sequence of signs PrivKeyk = (b
k
1 , . . . b
k
L) are called the
quantum signature and the private key, respectively, for message k. The individual state ρkl we call the l
th quantum
signature element state for message k.
2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob (Charlie), for each element l of QuantSigk for k = 0, 1, randomly chooses to either forward the signature
element to Charlie (Bob), or keep it and directly measure it as described under 4. below. In either case, the position
l is recorded. We should note here that it is not important that Bob and Charlie exchange states at the same time.
The protocol is secure even if the signature element exchanges are not synchronized. This is a significant improvement
over multiport-based schemes where near-perfect synchronization was essential 3.
4. Bob (Charlie) measures the states he kept and the states that Charlie (Bob) sent him, randomly choosing either
the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis or the {|−〉 , |+〉} basis. In this way, for each signature element Bob or Charlie measures, each of
them unambiguously excludes one of the four possible states. For example, if Bob obtains the measurement result
“|1〉”, this means that Alice cannot have sent the state |0〉. Bob and Charlie record what state they excluded, for
each element l and message k. This type of quantum measurement is called quantum state elimination [6, 13, 14].
The sequence of excluded states will later be used to authenticate or verify a message. We call this an eliminated
signature.
5. If either Bob or Charlie receives, from the other party, fewer than L(1/2− r) or more than L(1/2 + r) signature
elements per possible message, then they abort. That is, in the ideal case with no transmission losses 4, Bob expects
on average L/2 signature elements from Charlie, and aborts if he receives too few or too many by setting a threshold
r. If all participants are honest, then the probability for abort depends on the “coin” that Bob (Charlie) tosses to
decide whether to keep or forward a qubit. Since the choice is done independently, with equal probabilities for each
instance, it follows that this probability decays exponentially as L increases.
At this point, for some positions l in the quantum signature, Bob (Charlie) has measured both copies of signature
elements which Alice sent, for some he has measured the signature element copy sent directly to him by Alice, for
some the copy originally sent to Charlie (Bob), and for some positions he has measured no copy at all. Each of these
possibilities occurs for on average L/4 positions. Bob, for each signature element position, has therefore ruled out one,
two or none of the four possible states, and similarly for Charlie. These records form Bob’s and Charlie’s eliminated
signatures.
Messaging stage
1. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends (m,PrivKeym) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
2. Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches his stored eliminated signature by counting how many elements of
Alice’s private key he actually ruled out in the distribution stage. If there are fewer than saL mismatches , where sa
is a small authentication threshold (zero in the ideal case), Bob accepts the message.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the pair (m,PrivKeym) he received from Alice.
4. Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but in order to protect against repudiation by Alice, the threshold is
different. Charlie accepts the forwarded message if there are fewer than svL mismatches, where sv is the verification
threshold, with 0 ≤ sa < sv < 1.
Security analysis. Digital signature schemes should be secure against both repudiation and forging. Security
against repudiation guarantees that Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity (and consequently
the content) of her message (except with very small probability). Security against forging means that any recipient
will with high probability reject any message which was not originally sent by Alice herself. The security analysis is
outlined below, with more details in Appendix A.
Security against repudiation: Alice initially sends (possibly different) strings of BB84 states to Bob and Charlie.
More generally, she could send any states, including entangled states. Bob and Charlie randomly choose to keep or
forward each of the signature elements. From Alice’s perspective, at the end of the distribution stage, the reduced
density matrices for Bob’s and Charlie’s quantum states are identical, irrespective of what states she sent them.
Intuitively (see Appendix A for a proof), she thus has little chance of making Bob accept and Charlie reject the same
declaration. Moreover, Alice gains nothing by sending different quantum signatures to Bob and Charlie. Her best
strategy is to send a declaration with L(sv − sa)/2 mismatches with the quantum signature she sent. Her probability
3 Exchanging parts of the signature in practical implementations leads to losses increasing with the distance between the recipients.
However, the multiport used in e.g. [5] also incurs other substantial losses. In addition to losses in multiport beam splitters and other
optical elements, a more serious issue is the increasingly difficult synchronization between Bob and Charlie, since even a slight time shift
significantly decreases visibility.
4 For simplicity, we assume no transmission losses during this stage. Nevertheless, also for an imperfect realization it should be possible
to modify protocol parameters to ensure security, following approaches in [4, 16, 18].
4for repudiation is then
p(rep) ≤ exp[−(sv − sa)2L/2] (2)
which, since sa < sv, decays exponentially as the length L of the signature increases. Note that setting a non-zero sa
will be necessary if the quantum channels are not ideal.
Security against forging: In order to successfully forge, Bob needs to guess, causing fewer than Lsv mismatches,
the part of the signature that Alice sent to Charlie and which Charlie kept. In so-called individual forging attacks,
Bob makes measurements on individual signature elements. Bob, in order to make the best possible guess, should
then perform minimum-error measurements on his elements. One can show (Appendix A,[15]) that for each element,
the minimum probability for Bob to declare a mismatch is 1/8, leading to a bound
p(forge) ≤ exp[−2(1/8− svL/K)2K] (3)
on the forging probability, where K = L(1/2−r) is the number of elements that Charlie kept. This probability decays
exponentially with the length L of the signature provided that sv < 1/8(K/L) = 1/16(1 − 2r). In fact, the bound
in Eq. (3) is the best a forger can achieve with any strategy, including coherent attacks. To show this, we follow
the arguments of [16] for the security of a relativistic quantum bit commitment protocol [17]. The central result we
employ shows that no coherent measurement strategy can beat a local strategy in correctly declaring the state of
an individual signature key element, even if one post-selects on any measurement outcomes for all other elements.
We can then show that the individual strategies for forging are optimal: see AppendixA for details. Note that this
proof applies specifically to the BB84 versions of the protocols considered here, and for example does not generalize
to versions considered previously using B92 states.
III. PROTOCOL P2
The second protocol, P2, achieves the functionality of QDS by using only (long) shared keys and untrusted classical
channels. Shared keys can, of course, be achieved using a secure classical channel. Alternatively, QKD can be used
for generating shared keys, with information-theoretic security. If QKD is thought of as key expansion, this requires
only short pre-shared keys, effectively independent of future message size.
For QKD, we must also assume that untrusted quantum channels are available. In short, protocol P2 may be based
on point-to-point QKD, which is under development in many research groups and even commercially available [19–23].
Distribution stage
1. For each possible future message k = 0, 1, Alice generates two different secret keys (called signatures) consisting
of sequences of classical bits. We call an individual bit the lth signature element for message k.
2. For each possible message k = 0, 1, Alice sends one secret key to Bob and the other to Charlie via secure classical
channels.
3. For each signature element and for k = 0, 1, Bob (Charlie) randomly chooses to either keep it or send it to Charlie
(Bob) via a secure classical channel.
4. If either Bob or Charlie receives fewer than L(1/2 − r) or more than L(1/2 + r) signature elements per possible
message from the other party, then the protocol is aborted.
Messaging stage
1. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends (m,PrivKeyBm,PrivKeyCm) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
That is, Alice declares both private keys corresponding to the message m in order to sign.
2. Bob checks whether the declaration (m,PrivKeyBm,PrivKeyCm) matches his key and the parts of the key that
Charlie sent him. If it does, then he accepts the message. For classical keys, we can assume that if all parties are
honest then there are no mismatches, and therefore we can set sa = 0.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the declaration (m,PrivKeyBm,PrivKeyCm) he
received from Alice. Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but accepts the forwarded message if the following
two conditions are met. (i) There is no mismatch between the declaration and the part of PrivKeyBm which Charlie
obtained from Bob and (ii) there are fewer than svL mismatches between the declaration and Charlie’s PrivKeyCm,
where the verification threshold for security against repudiation satisfies 1/2 > sv > 0.
Security against repudiation: Alice needs to make Bob accept the message while Charlie rejects. This means that
Alice’s declaration cannot have any mismatch with Bob’s key, and necessarily at least svL mismatches with Charlie’s
key. The probability for repudiation then satisfies
p(rep) ≤ (1/2)svL, (4)
where the RHS decays exponentially with increasing signature length L (more details in Appendix A).
5Security against forging: Bob needs to guess, with fewer than Lsv mismatches, the K ≥ L(1/2 − r) elements of
Charlie’s key that he did not receive (i.e. provided no abort occurred). The probability for each correct guess is 1/2,
and the forging probability therefore satisfies
p(forge) ≤ exp
[
−4
(
1/4− sv
1− 2r
)2
L(1− 2r)
]
. (5)
Provided that sv < 1/4− r/2, this decays exponentially with increasing L (more details in Appendix A).
IV. DISCUSSION
We have here proposed and examined QDS schemes suitable for implementation with current technology, in particu-
lar, with the same requirements as for QKD systems. In previous schemes [5, 6], while the very demanding requirement
for quantum memory was removed, transferrability was guaranteed using a multiport. The multiport leads to high
losses and greater experimental complexity, severely restricting the distance between Bob and Charlie. To obtain a
truly feasible QDS scheme we here suggested two (main) QDS protocols that do not require a multiport. Protocol
P1, other than the multiport, requires similar resources as protocols in [5, 6]. Importantly, the simplifications we have
introduced also allow a security proof of QDS against coherent forging attacks. For protocol P2, we suggest that QKD
is used to obtain classical secret keys shared pairwise between all parties. The long shared keys are then shown to
enable the functionality of (Q)DS. P2 is, to our knowledge, is the first information-theoretically secure classical digital
signature scheme relying only on secret shared keys, without further assumptions such as a trusted third party or
authenticated broadcast channels [8–10]. This illustrates how novel classical protocols can arise inspired by quantum
information science.
We now briefly address the question of how one could relax the assumption of quantum authenticated channels,
while still preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and other eavesdropping attacks. It is likely that one could use
procedures analogous to the parameter estimation (PE) phase of QKD protocols. Here, Alice and Bob sacrifice a
random selection of quantum states in order to establish how correlated their measurement outcomes are. Based on
the level of correlations in the announced bits, they can deduce that the remaining (unannounced) bits are similarly
correlated, using the quantum de Finetti theorem [25, 26]. The protocol is aborted if the level of correlations is
insufficient. A similar approach could be used in QDS: Alice and each of the recipients could in the distribution stage
sacrifice parts of the quantum signatures. The level of correlations could be used to infer the level of correlations
between Alice’s private key and the classical measurement outcomes the recipients obtain in the distribution stage, in
analogy with PE. Again, a suitable threshold (related to the signature length L, or more precisely, the desired security
level) on the correlations should be imposed, and the protocol should be aborted if it is violated. We note that in QDS,
since the participants need not—and should not!—have identical signatures, other types of classical post-processing
used in QKD, such as information reconciliation, may not be required. We leave a full rigorous investigation of this
for future work.
Many other open questions still remain. For instance, a composable security analysis for both protocols is still an
open issue. It is also important to examine exactly how to generalise the presented protocols for more than three
parties, or for signing longer messages. For instance, one needs to allow for coalitions of malevolent participants.
Finally, entanglement-based protocols which may lead to device-independent QDS can also be envisaged.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Material
We first give a protocol P1’, which is similar to protocol P1 but assumes somewhat different resources. Then we
discuss the security of protocol P1 against both repudiation and forging. Finally we examine the security of protocol
6P2.
1. Modified protocol P1’
Here we outline a modified version of P1 which we call P1’. While the security analysis of P1’ is essentially identical
to that of P1, P1’ uses different resources. In particular, the assumption of an authenticated quantum channel between
Bob and Charlie is replaced by the assumption of a secure classical channel between Bob and Charlie (which could
be, for instance, achieved by using QKD and an authenticated classical channel). The changes in the protocol are the
following:
• When Bob (Charlie) receives the quantum signature from Alice, he immediately measures all qubits he receives,
using the same measurement as in P1 to exclude one of the possible states. We refer to this as an unambiguous
state elimination (USE) measurement.
• Subsequently, Bob (Charlie) for each element of the signature randomly decides to (i) either keep the outcome
in classical memory or (ii) send the outcome via a classical secure channel to Charlie (Bob). In the latter case,
they will not use the classical record of the outcome in the subsequent protocol (if they are honest – this is to
make things fully symmetric from Alice’s point of view).
If Bob and Charlie are honest, they end up with precisely the same set of outcomes as they would in protocol P1.
The security analysis with respect to repudiation is therefore identical for P1 and P1’. If Bob is dishonest, then the
security of P1’ is guaranteed by that half of signature elements which Alice sent to Charlie, for which Charlie kept
the outcomes. The security analysis for forging is therefore also identical for protocols P1 and P1’.
2. Security of protocol P1
The notion of security for QDS is different than for QKD. For QDS, one needs to separately consider the probability
for repudiation (when Alice is malevolent) and forging (when Bob is malevolent). For a protocol to be secure, one
requires that both of these probabilities should decay exponentially with the length of the signature L. This implies
that any desired level of security ǫ can be achieved, while inducing only a logarithmic overhead, by choosing L to be
O(log(1/ǫ)). Then, one can choose the parameters of the protocol sa and sv so as to minimize the maximum overall
probability for malevolent behaviour. Typically, this happens when repudiation and forging probabilities are equal, if
security against repudiation and forging are considered equally important. Here we will first show that the probability
of repudiation decreases exponentially with L, and then show the corresponding result for the forging probability. In
this paper we assume that quantum authenticated channels are used during the distribution of quantum signatures.
Given this assumption, any level of security can be efficiently achieved, irrespective of the level of losses. We note
that, however, if one wishes to remove this assumption, then, similarly to QKD protocols, there will be limits on the
allowable losses, above which a QDS protocol is no longer secure.
a. Security against repudiation
During the distribution stage, Alice sends L qubits to Bob and L qubits to Charlie for each possible message. To
specify which qubit we refer to, we say that qubit bi is the i
th qubit sent to Bob, while ci the i
th qubit sent to Charlie.
Note that during the distribution stage Bob and Charlie exchange qubits, and that the labels above refer to which
person Alice initially sent the qubit to.
At the end of the distribution stage, Bob and Charlie have measured all the 2L qubits using USE measurements.
Since we assume that there is an authenticated quantum channel between Bob and Charlie, Alice cannot tamper with
the states forwarded from Bob to Charlie and vice versa. From her point of view, each qubit is equally likely to end
up being measured by either Bob or Charlie. For each of the 2L qubits, either Bob or Charlie has ruled out one
possible state (out of four BB84 states). If Alice tries to repudiate a message, she sends a declaration which she wants
Bob to accept and Charlie to reject. For each qubit the declaration either is compatible (a match, which we denote
as 1), or is not compatible (a mismatch, which we denote as 0) with the classically stored information of what states
have been ruled out. We therefore have a sequence of binary outcomes r = (b1, · · · , bL, c1, · · · , cL) where b and c take
values {0, 1} and b, c refer to the which party the qubit was initially sent while the subscript denotes the position in
the signature the qubit had. There are 22L different sequences r but not all of them can be achieved by Alice (e.g. if
the state ruled out for bm and cm is different, it is not possible that both bm and cm give a mismatch).
7For any fixed sequence of outcomes r, there is some probability prep(r) that Alice repudiates. This depends on
which elements end up in Bob’s and which end up in Charlie’s possession, which is not determined by Alice. By
sending the overall quantum signature ρbc to Bob and Charlie, Alice generates a probability distribution on different
outcomes r. We will denote the probability of getting outcome r if Alice sends the overall state ρbc as p
ρbc(r). It
follows that the overall repudiation probability given that Alice sends a total state ρbc is
pρbcrep =
∑
r
pρbc(r) × prep(r). (A1)
We can see that the probability of repudiation is bounded by maxr prep(r). In what follows, we show that maxr prep(r)
decays exponentially as the length of the signature L increases.
Now we separately consider the subset initially sent to Bob and the subset initially sent to Charlie. Let p¯B0 (r) be
the average number of mismatches divided by L, for Bob’s subset of signature elements in the outcome sequence r,
and similarly p¯C0 (r) for Charlie’s subset. That is, for r = (b1, · · · , bL, c1, · · · , cL), we have p¯B0 (r) = 1− 1/L
∑
k bk and
p¯C0 (r) = 1− 1/L
∑
k ck.
After randomly exchanging subsystems, the expected proportion of mismatches for both Bob and Charlie per
signature element is the same and is given by
pB
′
0 = p
C′
0 = 1/2(p¯
B
0 + p¯
C
0 ) = p, (A2)
where we have suppressed the r-dependence for clarity. We can now see using the Hoeffding inequality [27], that if
pB
′
0 > sa, then the probability of Bob accepting is bounded by
p(Bob accepting) = P (p−XB ≥ p− sa) ≤ exp(−2(p− sa)2L) (A3)
and the probability of Charlie rejecting, provided that p < sv, is
p(Charlie rejecting) = P (XC − p ≥ sv − p) ≤ exp(−2(sv − p)2L). (A4)
Here XB and XC are the actual proportions of mismatches obtained by Bob and Charlie respectively. We note that
prep ≤ min{p(Bob accepting), p(Charlie rejecting)}. (A5)
It follows that the optimum choice for Alice to maximize the probability for repudiation is to aim for p = (sa+ sv)/2,
leading to the best repudiation probability
pρbcrep ≤ exp(−(sv − sa)2L/2) (A6)
which, given that sa < sv, decays exponentially as the length L of the signature increases. Note that in the main
paper, we have for clarity used the simpler notation p(rep) instead of pρbcrep.
b. Security against forging
The proof follows the following structure. First we derive the best measurement that minimises the probability of a
mismatch between the forger’s declaration and the honest recipient’s measurement, for a single element of the signa-
ture. Using this we give a bound on the forging probability if one restricts Bob to measuring each quantum signature
element individually. Then we prove that performing a coherent attack, and then conditioning on any sequence of
outcomes, cannot increase the success probability for avoiding mismatch for the Nth element. We prove that this
requirement implies that no coherent attack can perform better than the individual attack described earlier. In this
proof we follow closely the security analysis of Croke and Kent [16] for the security of the relativistic bit commitment
scheme by Kent [17]. The underlying mathematical problem from the forger’s point of view is very similar. Our
analysis holds in the case that the protocol is performed using the BB84 states, and we will comment on this at the end.
Individual Attacks :
Lemma 1. Suppose Alice selects a single BB84 state |ψA〉, chosen uniformly at random, prepares two copies of it,
and gives one to Bob and one to Charlie. Charlie makes a USE measurement, ruling out one of the three states that
Alice did not send, |ψC〉. Then, whatever measurement Bob performs on his copy, the probability p of Bob declaring
a single state |ψB〉, which happens to be the one that Charlie ruled out (so |ψB〉 = |ψC〉), is at least p ≥ Cmin = 1/8.
An optimal strategy that realizes this bound is to measure either in the {|0〉 , |1〉} or in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis, or to
perform any POVM Π whose elements are weighted combinations of these projective measurements, with measurement
operators Π = {q |0〉 〈0| , (1 − q) |+〉 〈+| , q |1〉 〈1| , (1 − q) |−〉 〈−|}.
8Proof. Finding the minimum probability that Bob’s guess is not ruled out by Charlie is a minimum-cost problem. If
Bob could always guess what state Alice sent, then he would never generate a mismatch. However, not all mistakes
Bob makes will be detected by Charlie with equal probability. If Alice sends the state |0〉, then it is more likely that
Charlie will rule out the state |1〉 than either of the states |+〉 , |−〉, so the “cost” for Bob making the declaration |1〉
is greater. The relevant cost matrix is then given by
C =


0 1/4 1/2 1/4
1/4 0 1/4 1/2
1/2 1/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/2 1/4 0

 , (A7)
where the states appear in the order (|0〉 , |+〉 , |1〉 , |−〉), and the rows correspond to the state that Alice sent and the
columns to the state Bob declares.
One can see that an optimal measurement that Bob can perform is to measure either in the {|0〉 , |1〉} or in the
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis, either by directly checking that the Holevo-Helstrom conditions hold [28] or by using the results of
[15] for minimum-cost measurements of symmetric states. One should note, however, that any convex combination of
the above projective measurements results in a POVM that gives the same (i.e. the minimum) cost. The minimum
cost is Cmin = 1/8, as one can see by evaluating the expression
C =
∑
i,j
1
4
Ci,jTr(Πjρi), (A8)
where ρi are the BB84 states and Πj are the elements of the POVM used (which are projections, if we are using
a projective measurement). Intuitively, when Bob chooses to measure in the basis which includes the state Alice
sent, which happens with probability 1/2, he obtains the correct answer, and thus in this case he never generates
a mismatch. When Bob chooses the wrong basis, which happens with probability 1/2, he causes a mismatch with
probability 1/4. The overall probability that Bob causes a mismatch is therefore 1/8.
The above Lemma means that the probability that Bob generates a mismatch for a single element is at least Cmin,
which can be achieved by the above measurement. Thus, in individual attacks, Bob’s probability of not being detected
for a single element is (1 − Cmin). Here it is worth noting that with similar arguments one can compute Cmax = 3/8
which is the maximum probability of mismatch that one can achieve.
In order to succeed in forging, Bob needs to correctly declare the part of the signature that Alice sent to Charlie
and which Charlie kept. More specifically, he has to avoid mismatches with Charlie’s classical signature only for these
signature elements. Taking the worst-case scenario, we assume that Bob knows which bits Charlie keeps, before Bob
forwards any signature elements to Charlie. In this case, for all the elements which Charlie does not keep, Bob can,
instead of forwarding the quantum signature element that Alice sent him, send to Charlie a state that will certainly
match the declaration that Bob will make later on. Therefore, for Bob to succeed in forging he must make fewer than
svL mistakes for the (on average) L/2 elements that Charlie received directly from Alice and did not forward to Bob.
Taking again the worst-case scenario, we assume that Charlie kept the fewest possible elements, K = L(1/2 − r),
where r is the abort threshold. Bob can use his own copies of these K elements to make his best guess of a declaration
that will be accepted by Charlie, and he is free to perform any measurement that will maximize his probability of
forging not being detected.
For now, we will restrict attention to individual attacks. As we showed in Lemma 1, the probability of mismatch
in a single element is at least Cmin. Bob generates mismatches only for the K elements he needs to guess, while
the threshold sv of accepted mismatches concerns the full signature length L. Therefore the effective fraction of
mismatches that his guess needs to keep below is svL/K. For the protocol to be secure we need Cmin > svL/K ≈ 2sv.
Then the probability P (forge| individual attack) of “individual forging” decays exponentially. Using the Hoeffding
inequalities [27] for the K = L(1/2− r) elements we obtain the expression
P (forge| individual attack) ≤ exp(−2(Cmin − svL/K)2K). (A9)
Theorem 1. The probability that Bob generates a signature that causes fewer than sv mismatches, if he is only
allowed to perform individual measurements, is bounded above by exp(−2(Cmin− svL/K)2K), where K = L(1/2− r).
The same bound also holds for individual adaptive measurements, as the individual states are uncorrelated. This
we will show below, as a step of the security proof concerning arbitrary coherent attack strategies.
Coherent Attacks :
In the following Lemma we prove that the probability of making a guess that results in a mismatch for (any) N th
element cannot decrease, even if Bob applies a joint (coherent) strategy and also post-selects (conditions) on any
9sequence of outcomes of the previous (N − 1) elements. For this, we follow the technique used in the proof by Croke
and Kent in [16]. One should note that the following proof applies specifically to the protocol P1, and relies on the
particular structure of the BB84 states. Therefore, one cannot immediately generalize this type of proof to other QDS
protocols, for instance the ones which use phase-encoded coherent states.
Lemma 2. Suppose Alice generates two copies of a sequence of i.i.d. BB84 states |ψAi〉Ni=1, randomly chosen from
the uniform distribution, and gives one copy to Bob and one to Charlie. Charlie makes a USE measurement on
each element in his sequence, ruling out one BB84 state
∣∣ψCj〉Nj=1 for each element. Bob follows a strategy S and
makes a (possibly) coherent measurement on his sequence in order to make a guess |ψBk〉Nk=1 for each state. Let
pg = pA1,··· ,AN−1;C1,··· ,CN−1;B1,··· ,BN−1 be the probability that Bob’s guess for the N
th state that Alice sent (|ψAN 〉) is
the state that Charlie ruled out (|ψCN 〉), conditional on Alice sending the sequence of states |eA1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eAN−1〉, Charlie
ruling out the states |eC1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eCN−1〉 and Bob having guessed the states |eB1〉 , · · · , ∣∣eBN−1〉. Then pg ≥ Cmin = 1/8
for any strategy S and any {A1, · · · , AN−1;C1, · · · , CN−1;B1, · · · , BN−1} consistent with S.
Proof. Suppose some collective strategy S violates this bound for some values
{A1, · · · , AN−1, C1, · · · , CN−1, B1, · · · , BN−1}. Bob could then proceed in the following way in order to mea-
sure a single unknown BB84 state |ψAN 〉 of a sequence. Essentially, Bob’s strategy below would amount to using the
coherent strategy on N qubits, consisting of N − 1 “dummy qubits” prepared by himself, and one half of a pair of
maximally entangled qubits. If the outcomes at a certain stage in this procedure are as desired, Bob would proceed to
“teleport in” the single unknown BB84 state into the N th place in the qubit sequence, thereby effectively measuring
it.
1. Bob prepares an entangled singlet state of two qubits.
2. Bob prepares (N − 1) BB84 states |eA1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eAN−1〉 and imagines that Charlie has (supposedly) ruled out the
states |eC1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eCN−1〉 which are consistent with the states that Alice (supposedly) sent. We note that Alice
and Charlie do not in reality send these states or carry out these measurements. Instead, Bob does everything,
in order to use his collective strategy to avoid mismatch for the N th state, which Alice really did send.
3. Bob applies strategy S (ignoring the knowledge of the actual states |eA1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eAN−1〉 and the excluded states
|eC1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eCN−1〉) to the (N − 1) BB84 states and one of the entangled qubits.
4. For the first (N − 1) states, Bob checks the guesses produced by S.
5. If the results do not agree with |eB1〉 , · · · ,
∣∣eBN−1〉, Bob returns to step 1 with a new singlet and (N − 1) new
BB84 states. If they do agree, he proceeds to step 6.
6. Bob applies a teleportation operation on the unknown BB84 state |ψAN 〉 and the other qubit of the singlet
pair and obtains the unitary correction U = XaZb. Bob examines the output of the strategy S, to see what
guess it implies for the Nth element. Bob applies the corrections XaZb to the classical recorded outcomes. By
assumption, the adjusted guess is the state excluded by Charlie with probability pg < 1/8 = Cmin.
This process is bound to proceed to step 6 eventually. The state |ψAN 〉 is left isolated until step 6 is reached, and
no assumption is made about what state |ψCN 〉 Charlie rules out for the Nth element. Bob therefore has a strategy
that produces a guess for a single state |ψAN 〉 that happens to be the state that Charlie ruled out (thus causing a
mismatch), with probability p < 1/8 = Cmin, contradicting Lemma 1.
Following the same proof one can also prove that no conditional probability can give mismatch probability greater
than Cmax = 3/8, which is also achieved by an individual strategy. Then, by taking convex combinations of the
optimal (maximum-achieving and minimum-achieving) individual measurements one can show that all the probabilities
for match or mismatch that one can achieve with conditional measurements, can also be achieved by individual
measurements. For the proof to work, it is crucial that the teleportation correction operations applied to any of the
possible states Alice could have sent results in another possible state. This is the case for the BB84 states, but notably
it is not the case for two non-orthogonal states.
Using this lemma we can now prove that no coherent strategy can improve Bob’s forging probability over the optimal
individual attack. The proof is summarized as follows. First we introduce a modification of the verification procedure,
and show that the forging probability using adaptive local measurements in the modified protocol upper bounds the
forging probability of any coherent strategy in the original protocol. Following this, we show that local adaptive
measurements, in the modified protocol, cannot improve Bob’s cheating probability over individual independent
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measurements. To close the loop, we show that, for individual independent measurements, the cheating probabilities
of the original and modified protocol are the same.
In the modification of the verification procedure, Bob selects an order on the qubits (it could be also specified by the
protocol), performs local measurements, and declares the states to Charlie sequentially, and finds out, for each state
whether the declaration was a match or a mismatch. This allows Bob to modify his local measurements depending
on the sequence of previous outcomes, and depending on whether these resulted in matches or mismatches. Without
the loss of generality we will assume that Bob will measure his qubits (i.e. the corresponding ancilla states) in the
natural order of the indices.
Let V denote the a forging strategy, using coherent strategies, on the original protocol. The overall forging proba-
bility can always be written as
p(forge) =
∑
σ∈A
p(σ) (A10)
where σ = (x1, · · · , xL) is any string of matches/mismatches (say, the variable xi ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the ith
declared element matches “0” or mismatches “1” the excluded element of Charlie) and A is the set of all strings σ
that have fewer than svL 1’s (mismatches).
Then, for the strategy V , each probability pV (σ) of the individual event σ = (x1, · · · , xL) can be written using the
chain rule as
pV (σ) = pV (x1, · · · , xL) = pV (x1)pV (x2|x1)pV (x3|x2, x1) · · · pV (xL|xL−1, . . . x1) (A11)
By Lemma 2 and the comment thereafter regarding the maximal probability of causing a mismatch, we have that
Cmax ≥ pV (xk = 1|xk, xk−1, . . . x2, x1) ≥ Cmin, ∀k, ∀(xk, xk−1, . . . x2, x1) (A12)
where both Cmin and Cmax can be achieved by local measurement strategies. This implies that for each sequence of
prior outcomes (xk, xk−1, . . . x2, x1), there exists a local strategy/measurementMk,xk−1,...x2,x1 acting only on qubit k,
which is a convex combination of the strategies maximizing a mismatch and a match such that
pMk,xk−1,...x2,x1 (xk) = pV (xk|xk, xk−1, . . . x2, x1). (A13)
This proves that for every coherent strategy in the original protocol, there exists an adaptive local strategy in
the modified protocol which recovers the probability distribution over matches/mismatches of the coherent strategy.
Hence we have:
P (forge|coherent attack, original protocol) ≤ P (forge|adaptive local attack,modified protocol). (A14)
Next, we show that the best adaptive local strategy in the modified protocol is the optimal individual (non-adaptive)
strategy. To see this, first note that at the kth step of the verification procedure, since all the measurements made so
far have been local, the remainder of the L− k qubits have not been perturbed. This implies that the probability of
obtaining a match on the next, (L− k)th qubit, does not depend on the previous k measurement outcomes (or decla-
rations of match/mismatch), since the qubit states are not correlated (and neither are the verification measurements
of Charlie). This intuitively shows that the optimal strategy are local optimal measurements, but for completeness,
we prove this formally. First we give a trivial claim: given L′ signature states and some threshold k, the probability
P (Xmatch ≥ k) of getting at least k matches is higher than or equal to the probability P (Xmatch ≥ k + 1) of getting
at least k + 1 matches, that is P (Xmatch ≥ k) ≥ P (Xmatch ≥ k + 1). This is trivial as the event Xmatch ≥ k is
contained in the event Xmatch ≥ k + 1. In the remainder we will use k to denote the forging threshold of matches so
k = ⌈L − svL⌉. Suppose Bob is at some stage l of the (modified) verification procedure. There are two possibilities,
either he obtained the k required matches for cheating or he did not. If he obtained the matches, then the remain-
der of declarations does not change his (unit) forging probability, and any strategy (in particular, the optimal local
(non-adaptive) strategy ) is optimal. Alternatively, he still needs to obtain k′ ≤ k matches on the remainder of L− l
qubits. His forging probability, at that point, is given by
p(forge) = p(xl = 0)P (Xmatch ≥ k′ − 1) + p(xl = 1)P (Xmatch ≥ k′). (A15)
That is, either he gets the lth qubit correctly, after which he needs only k′ − 1 matches, or he does not, and still
requires k′ matches for the remaining qubits. Since P (Xmatch ≥ k′ − 1) ≥ P (Xmatch ≥ k′), the expression above is
optimized by maximizing p(xl = 0), which occurs with the optimal local measurement (and is independent of any
11
previous outcomes). Since this argument holds for all l, this means that the local (non-adaptive) strategy is optimal,
i.e.
P (forge|adaptive local attack,modified protocol) ≤ P (forge|individual attack,modified protocol). (A16)
However, since the optimal individual strategy does not use the declarations Charlie provides in the modified verifi-
cation protocol, this implies that the forging probability using non-adaptive measurements in the original protocol,
and in the modified protocol, are equal:
P (forge|individual attack,modified protocol) = P (forge|individual attack, original protocol), (A17)
and since coherent attacks contain individual attacks, we have
P (forge|coherent attack, original protocol) = P (forge|individual attack, original protocol). (A18)
Combining this result with Theorem 1, we have proven the following main Theorem:
Theorem 2. The probability that Bob, by measuring his sequence of states, generates a signature declaration with
fewer than sv mismatches is bounded by p(forge) ≤ exp(−2(Cmin − svL/K)2K), where K = L(1/2 − r). That is,
the forging probability of the presented QDS protocol decays exponentially with the signature length L for all possible
attacks.
Further remarks :
We had previously stressed that the presented proof of security against general (coherent) forging attacks crucially
depends on the choice of BB84 states for the signature elements. In particular, step 6 of Lemma 2 fails in the general
case. The results of Lemma 2 can be extended to any set of states S for which there exists a teleportation procedure
with correction operators which leave the set S invariant. This will imply that the correction operators simply permute
the input set, which allows for Bob to ‘correct’ the classical outcome of his post-selected strategy which would violate
the individual measurement bound. In particular, Lemma 2 does not hold for the so-called B92 states {|0〉 , |+〉}. One
can construct a counter-example with just two copies of B92 states (see example in [15]). Alice sends one of the four
states {|00〉 , |0+〉 , |+0〉 , |++〉}. Let Bob measure in the basis
|φ++〉 = 1/
√
2(|01〉+ |10〉) (A19)
|φ+0〉 = 1/
√
2(|0−〉+ |1+〉) (A20)
|φ0+〉 = 1/
√
2(|+1〉+ |−0〉) (A21)
|φ00〉 = 1/
√
2(|+−〉+ |−+〉), (A22)
and make the relevant declaration to get a probability distribution pM (x1, x2) on matches and mismatches. This
measurement by construction guarantees that he never gets both elements wrong (e.g. if he obtains φ++, it means
that Alice did not send the state φ00, so he obtains at most one mismatch). Now conditioning on the first qubit to
be a mismatch, he obtains pM (x2 = 0|x1 = 1) = 1. This is clearly better than the optimal local strategy, which can
never succeed with unit probability, 1 = pM (x2 = 0|x1 = 1) > plocal(x2 = 0).
When the states used for QDS are not suitable for the type of security proof we presented here, following [16]
one could suggest an alternative proof based on maximum confidence measurements (MCM)[29]. The basic idea
here would be to produce a bound by considering MCM’s, and further conditioning on these always producing a
conclusive outcome. Due to this post-selection the obtained bound is not tight, but can be applied to a larger variety
of quantum states. However, this approach still cannot be applied to linearly independent states (such as the B92
states, or phase-encoded coherent states), as in this case it yields a trivial bound of pforge = 1.
3. Security of protocol P2
We will first show for protocol P2 that the probability for repudiation decreases exponentially with the length L
and then do the same for the forging probability.
a. Security against repudiation
In order to repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message while Charlie rejects it. Since Bob has to accept
the message, Alice’s declaration must agree with all the elements of PrivKeyBm. On the other hand, for Charlie
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to reject the message, he needs to detect at least svL mistakes. These should all come from PrivKeyCm. Coming
back to the requirement that Bob has to accept the message, we see that none of the elements that Bob receives from
Charlie should include a mismatch. Since Charlie sends each bit of his PrivKeyCm to Bob with probability 1/2, then
if there are R mismatches in PrivKeyCm, the probability for Bob to see no mismatches is (1/2)
R. It is also clear
that the best strategy for Alice is to send exactly R = svL mismatches to Charlie, and this leads to Alice’s optimum
repudiation probability
p(rep) ≤ (1/2)svL (A23)
which decays exponentially as the length of the signature L increases.
b. Security against forging
Bob, in order to forge, must give a declaration that has fewer than svL mismatches. Note that this protocol is
essentially classical, so if Alice sends a bit that does not agree with her future declaration, then the recipient detects
the mismatch deterministically. If Charlie sends more than L(1/2+r) bits of his private key to Bob, then the protocol
is aborted by step 4 of the distribution stage. We assume the worst-case scenario (for the honest participants, Charlie
and Alice) that Charlie has sent exactly L(1/2 + r) elements of his private key to Bob. This means that Bob must
guess the remaining K = L(1/2− r) bits in PrivKeyCm, making fewer than svL mistakes. The expected probability
of error for a single guess is 1/2. The empirical mean number of wrong guesses X¯ needs to be less than svL/K (in
other words, Bob should make fewer than svL mistakes among the K elements he is required to guess). This, using
Hoeffding’s inequalities [27], implies that the probability to forge is bounded by
p(forge) = p(1/2− X¯ ≥ 1/2− svL/K) ≤ exp
[−2(1/2− svL/K)2K]
= exp
[
−4
(
1/4− sv
1− 2r
)2
L(1− 2r)
]
. (A24)
which, provided that sv < 1/4− r/2, decays exponentially as L increases. Since typically r will be chosen to be small,
this condition agrees with the intuitive picture. A forger will on average guess half of the elements correctly, so he
would typically make O(L/4) mistakes. Therefore, choosing sv smaller than 1/4 guarantees the security.
Finally, it is important to note, that unlike in protocol P1 and its variants, in protocol P2 Alice sends different
signatures to Bob and Charlie. If Alice was to send the same signature to Bob and Charlie, and they are aware of
this, then forging would be possible.
[1] R. L. Rivest, Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, p. 717-755, Elsevier (1990).
[2] D. Gottesman and I. Chuang, arXiv:quant-ph/0105032v2 (2001).
[3] E. Andersson, M. Curty, and I. Jex, Phys. Rev. A 74, 022304 (2006).
[4] P. J. Clarke et al., Nat. Commun. 3, 1174 (2012).
[5] V. Dunjko, P. Wallden, and E. Andersson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 040502 (2014).
[6] R. J. Collins, R. J. Donaldson, V. Dunjko, P. Wallden, P. J. Clarke, E. Andersson, J. Jeffers, and G. S. Buller, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 113, 040502 (2014).
[7] L. Lamport, Technical Report CSL-98, SRI International (1979).
[8] G. Hanaoka, J. Shikata, Y. Zheng and H. Imai, Advances in Cryptology, LNCS, 1976 130, (2000).
[9] C. Swanson and D. Stinson, in [Information Theoretic Security] , First Edition, S. Fehr, Ed., Springer, Berlin Heidelberg,
100-116 (2011).
[10] D. Chaum and S. Roijakkers, in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in
Cryptology, A. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, Eds., 206 214 (1991).
[11] M. N. Wegman and J. L. Carter, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 22, 265 (1981).
[12] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal
Processing, Bangalore, p. 175 (1984).
[13] S. Barnett, Quantum Information, Oxford University Press, pp 103-104 (2009).
[14] S. Bandyopadhyay, R. Jain, J. Oppenheim, and C. Perry, Phys. Rev. A 89, 022336 (2014).
[15] P. Wallden, V. Dunjko and E. Andersson, J. Phys. A 47, 125303 (2014).
[16] S. Croke and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 86, 052309 (2012).
[17] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 130501 (2012).
[18] T. Lunghi et al, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 180504 (2013).
13
[19] id Quantique, http://www.idquantique.com, visited 21/03/2014.
[20] MagiQ Technologies, http://www.magiqtech.com, visited 21/03/2014.
[21] QuintessenceLabs, http://quintessencelabs.com/, visited 21/03/2014.
[22] SeQureNet, http://www.sequrenet.com, visited 21/03/2014.
[23] Quantum Communication Technology Co. Ltd. Anhui, http://www.quantum-info.com/en.php, visited 21/03/2014.
[24] H. Barnum, C. Cre´peau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith and A. Tapp Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, 2002.
[25] R. Renner, PhD Thesis, preprint quant-ph/0512258, 2005.
[26] R. Renner, Nat. Phys. 3, 645, 2007.
[27] W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc., 58 301, (1963).
[28] C. W. Helstrom Quantum detection and estimation theory. Academic Press, New York, 1976.
[29] S. Croke, E. Andersson, S. Barnett, C. Gilson and J. Jeffers, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 070401 (2006).
